From Individual to Shared Ownership: A Coalitional Game Approach to Sustainable Co-investment
Published 2026-07-29 · arXiv · Credibility S
This paper proposes a cooperative game-theoretic framework for sustainable co-investment in shared infrastructure under regulatory incentives. Multiple heterogeneous operators co-invest in a common infrastructure whose production capability evolves over time and is subject to operational variability. A regulator supports the deployment through incentive mechanisms designed to align individual economic investment obj…
Abstract, interpretation and reference
Abstract
This paper proposes a cooperative game-theoretic framework for sustainable co-investment in shared infrastructure under regulatory incentives. Multiple heterogeneous operators co-invest in a common infrastructure whose production capability evolves over time and is subject to operational variability. A regulator supports the deployment through incentive mechanisms designed to align individual economic investment objectives with the coalitional one. We formulate the co-investment problem as a transferable-utility (TU) coalitional game in which the value generated by cooperation depends on heterogeneous operational profiles, dynamic resource availability, investment costs, and regulatory incentive level. We show that the proposed coalitional game can be reformulated as a linear production game (LPG), whose dual prices yield a constructive and stable allocation of the cooperative surplus. Finally, we illustrate the proposed framework through a case study on co-investment among data center operators in shared renewable energy infrastructure, supported by government subsidies promoting renewable energy consumption.